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The paper extends the literature on ﬁnancial development, inﬂation,
and growth by using the idea that both the rates of return on physical
and human capital aﬀect growth. This leads to the introduction of the
investment rate into the model, as a proxy for the return to physical capital,
along with the inﬂation rate as a variable aﬀecting the return to human
capital. As a result ﬁnancial development plays a diﬀerent role from the
typical growth-enhancing eﬀect found pervasively in the literature. Instead
the results suggest a new hypothesis linking ﬁnancial development to the
nature of the eﬀect of inﬂation on growth.
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Rousseau and Wachtel (2001) observe that while much research focuses on the
three separate strands of ﬁnancial development and economic growth, inﬂation and
economic growth, and inﬂation and ﬁnancial development, less understood is how
inﬂation and ﬁnancial development jointly aﬀect economic growth. Inﬂation has
been found typically to have a negative eﬀect on growth, at least for an inﬂation
rate above a threshold level (see for example Ghosh and Phillips 1998, Khan and
Senhadji 2001, Gillman, Harris, and Matyas 2004). Financial development has
been found to increase economic growth, as in the seminal paper of King and
Levine (1993). Levine (1997) reviews such ﬁnancial development evidence, and
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000)) extend these results with robustness across
further measures of ﬁnancial development.
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) present a large model with various condi-
tioning variables. They ﬁnd a robustly positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial development on
growth, but also ﬁnd both a positive and negative eﬀect of inﬂation on growth,
depending on which ﬁnancial development variable is used. Rousseau and Wachtel
(2001) use a parsimonious model, present the regression results of a large panel
data set, and focus on the eﬀects of the inﬂation rate and of ﬁnancial development
on growth. They discuss how Andres and Lopez-Salido (1999) use a smaller panel
data set and ﬁnd that the eﬀect of ﬁnancial development is weak while there is
ar o b u s t l yn e g a t i v ee ﬀect of inﬂation. Here it is noted that Khan and Senhadji
(2000) also ﬁnd insigniﬁcance for some of their ﬁnancial development variables in
a panel study as based on a Mankiw, Romer, and Weil (1992) framework that
excludes the inﬂation rate.1 However Rousseau and Wachtel (2001) ﬁnd that
their ﬁnancial development variables signiﬁcantly aﬀe c tg r o w t hi nap o s i t i v e ,r o -
bust, fashion, thereby re-establishing the result of the traditional literature. Their
inﬂation eﬀect is negative and signiﬁcant, to a lesser degree than the ﬁnancial de-
1Their more standard variable, of domestic private credit as a share of GDP, showed signiﬁ-
cance however.
2velopment variable.
As an extension to the literature, the study here re-postulates the inﬂation
and ﬁnancial development variables within the framework of endogenous growth
models. As in Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004), the approach is to view the
growth rate as depending primarily on the rate of return to capital, partly as in
a standard Euler equation. Further, along the balanced-growth path equilibrium
the return to physical capital and to human capital is equal, and so the growth
model should focus on both of these returns.
The paper presents an econometric model that starts broadly as in Levine,
Loayza, and Beck (2000), and ends with a model almost as parsimonious as in
Rousseau and Wachtel (2001). As in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), the paper
includes the dynamic panel estimation as part of the investigation. Very robust
results are found for both ﬁnancial development and inﬂation eﬀects, but not as
in the traditional literature. Instead the results suggest a new hypothesis contrary
to conventional wisdom to some degree but still apparently plausible.
1.1. Variables in the Model Speciﬁcation
The return on physical capital that would ideally enter the model is the real rate
of interest. However including this directly is problematic in terms of data. Using
the nominal interest rate and subtracting the ex post inﬂation rate often leads to
negative real interest rate computations during periods of accelerating inﬂation.
An alternative is to proxy this real return by a variable that depends positively
on it. Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004) show that the savings rate within
a representative agent endogenous growth monetary economy depends positively
on the real interest rate to real wage rate ratio, the input price ratio; and with a
representative agent economy the savings rate equals the investment rate, which is
readily available in data. Therefore as well as factors aﬀecting the return to human
capital, the model of this paper includes the investment rate, as do Kormendi and
Meguire (1985) in the older Solow-Tobin growth literature that studied the eﬀect
of inﬂation on growth, and as do Ghosh and Phillips (1998) more recently.
3Including the investment rate as a proxy of the return on physical capital, the
paper also uses a representative agent strategy for considering the return on hu-
man capital. In the endogenous growth monetary models of Gomme (1993) and
Gillman and Kejak (2005), the return on human capital is signiﬁcantly decreased
by inﬂation rate increases. This decreased human capital return pushes down the
return to all capital and hence the growth rate. This happens because inﬂation
induces substitution from exchange goods to leisure; the increased leisure usage
causes a lessor utilization rate of human capital; the return to human capital and
the growth rate falls. This occurs to the extent that calibrations ﬁnd a magnitude
o ft h en e g a t i v ei n ﬂation-growth eﬀect consistent with empirical evidence. There-
fore the paper includes the inﬂation rate as a major factor that aﬀects the return
to human capital. Theoretically the negative inﬂation-growth eﬀect is nonlinear,
being monotonically stronger at lower levels of the inﬂation rate. This has been
identiﬁed empirically, as in Ghosh and Phillips (1998), Khan and Senhadji (2001)
and Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004), and theoretically as in Gillman and Ke-
jak (2005). It is allowed for in the model here by entering the inﬂation rate in
log-form.
Two other factors considered as signiﬁcant are those aﬀecting the return on
physical and human capital along the transitional dynamic paths. For this the
initial human capital level and the initial level of income are considered; however
only the initial level of income is robustly signiﬁcant and so constitutes a third
major variable of the base model. To this parsimonious base the level of ﬁnancial
development is added as a factor that may increase the return to either physical or
human capital. This addition is also based on a representative agent endogenous
growth economy such as in Gillman and Kejak (2005), in which a credit sector is
explicitly modeled and the credit technology parameters can aﬀect the growth rate.
Other standard factors are also considered by using the various conditioning sets
of Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000). Some of these other variables are signiﬁcant
in certain speciﬁcations, as the results section describes.
42. The Econometric Model
The econometric model is an extension of the framework in Levine, Loayza, and
Beck (2000). In its static form their model is speciﬁed as
git = αi + λt + βkF
k
it +[ CONDITIONING SET]
0
it γ + εit, (2.1)
where git is the real per capita annual rate of growth of GDP of country i in period
t; αi is an unobservable eﬀect (also known as an individual eﬀect)f o rc o u n t r yi;
λt is an unobservable eﬀect for time period t;a n dFk
it is the level of ﬁnancial
intermediary development. Financial development is proxied by k =3variables:
the log of the level of liquid liabilities to GDP, denoted by lly; the log of the level
of private assets to GDP, denoted by private; and the ratio of commercial assets
to total banking assets (results not reported). These have unknown weights βk.
The CONDITIONING SETit is a vector of controls generally associated with
economic growth, with unknown weights, γ. Finally there is a disturbance term
εit.
Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) consider three CONDITIONING SETS:
1. A Simple Conditioning Information Set, consisting of the logarithm of initial
per capita GDP and the initial level of educational attainment;
2. a Policy Conditioning Information Set, consisting of the Simple Conditioning
Set plus measures of government size, inﬂation, the black market exchange
premium and openness to international trade; and
3. a Full Conditioning Information Set, consisting of the Policy Conditioning
Information Set plus measures of political stability.
As with Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) the focus here is on the ﬁrst two
of these. However, as in Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004), the investment
to output ratio and the inﬂation rate are included in the simple conditioning
set. Further, an interaction term is hypothesized between inﬂation and ﬁnancial
development.
52.1. Financial Intermediation and Inﬂation Eﬀects on Growth
The model proposes that the ﬁnancial intermediary eﬀect, βk, is a function of the
inﬂation rate eﬀect. A simple way to allow for such an eﬀect is to write βk as
βk = φ + ξ ˙ pit, (2.2)
where φ and ξ are parameters. With this eﬀect, and for presentation purposes
taking the inﬂation term out of the conditioning set, equation (2.1) becomes
git = αi + λt + βkF
k




∗ + εit; (2.3)
= αi + λt +( φ + ξ ˙ pit)F
k





= αi + λt + φF
k
it + ξ ˙ pitF
k





The speciﬁcation includes the ﬁnancial development and inﬂation variables both
individually and in product, as an interaction term, along with the remainder of
the conditioning set.
2.2. Unobserved Heterogeneity
Following Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Rousseau and Wachtel (2001), we
take a panel data approach that follows the large cross-country growth literature
by considering blocks of ﬁve-yearly averages as our observational unit. In this way
the model accounts for both unobserved country and time eﬀects with a reduced
inﬂuence from short run variations. Unobserved country heterogeneity, captured
by the αi in equation (2.3), can arise for example from diﬀering domestic and
foreign trade policies that are not reﬂected in those observed variables identiﬁed
in equation (2.3). Country invariant time eﬀects,c a p t u r e db yt h eλt of equation
(2.3), are designed to pick up eﬀects for example from business cycle variations.
Equation (2.3) is generally known as a two-factor model. The issue of how to
treat the unobserved eﬀects αi and λt in the estimation procedure, is generally
one of the likely extent of correlation between the αi and the included explanatory
6variables, and between the λt and the included explanatory variables. In all of the
subsequent estimations the Hausman speciﬁcation test indicates the existence of
such correlation. This implies that both a simple OLS, as in traditional growth
literature, as well as a panel approach that conditions on unobserved heterogeneity
but ignores such correlation, is likely to yield biased parameter estimates.
With the existence of the correlation either a two-way ﬁxed eﬀects or a random
eﬀects speciﬁcation can be consistent. In the ﬁxed eﬀects approach, the eﬀects can
be treated as constants so as to remove any potential correlations. This requires
including one set of dummy variables for each country and another set for each
year.
2.3. Simultaneity Bias and Robustness Checks
The possibility of an endogeneity bias arising from simultaneity among growth,
inﬂation, and ﬁnancial development is investigated, following for example Ghosh
and Phillips (1998), Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), Rousseau and Wachtel
(2001), and Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004). Using panel data methods and
experimenting with instruments from Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), primarily
national legal origin, little evidence of endogeneity is found for the level of ﬁnancial
development.2
For the possible endogeneity of inﬂation, in contrast to most previous studies,
current and lagged values of the money supply are tested as instruments. The
money supply is chosen because standard monetary general equilibrium models
assume that the money supply growth rate is exogenous and is what “causes”
the inﬂa t i o nr a t ea l o n gt h eb a l a n c e d - g r o w t hp a t hi ns u c hm o d e l s( s e ef o re x a m -
ple Lucas 1980, Gillman and Kejak 2005). Crowder (1998) provides evidence of
Granger causality from money to inﬂation for the US; and Gillman and Nakov
(2004) provide similar evidence for two transition countries. With this money
supply instrument, the results are consistent across diﬀerent speciﬁcations. How-
2The time-invariant instruments that are used predominantly in Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000) cannot be used within a ﬁxed eﬀects framework.
7ever, experimenting with diﬀerent instruments found that the results are sensitive
to the instrument across the diﬀerent speciﬁcations. This can result when the in-
strument is either not strictly exogenous itself and/or is unrelated to the inﬂation
rate.
The results suggest on the whole that, as with the level of ﬁnancial develop-
ment, the null-hypothesis could not be rejected that the inﬂation rate as entered
into equation (2.3) is exogenous. The reported results reﬂect this by treating
t h e s ev a r i a b l e sa se x o g e n o u s . B u tw h i l en o tﬁnding signiﬁcant endogeneity of
ﬁnancial development and inﬂation, the Hausman speciﬁcation tests nonetheless
suggest the existence of correlation between the observed and unobserved eﬀects.
After proceeding with a ﬁxed eﬀects approach initially in Sections 4.1 and 4.2,
an attempt to account for the correlation within the random eﬀects framework is
reported in Section 4.3.1.
The other important robustness check is to investigate model stability through
estimation of a dynamic panel in Section 4.3.2. Given the literature suggesting a
signiﬁcant amount of persistence in growth rates, for example Lee, Longmire, Má-
tyás, and Harris (1998), we follow Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) by augmenting
the conditioning set variables with the previous year’s growth rate.
3. The Data
The data primarily comes from the set in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), for
which they cite the sources.3 The original sample consists of 74 countries over the
period 1961-1995. Supplementing this data with the investment to output ratio
(EconData) and the money supply (IFS) from Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004)
results in omitting many countries from the sample mainly because of a lack of
investment data. This reduces the sample to 27 countries with full information
on all required variables for at least two periods. These countries are Australia,
Austria, Belgium, Canada, Chile, Denmark, Finland, France, Greece, Ireland,
3We are very grateful to those authors for kindly supplying their data.
8Italy, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand,
Norway, Peru, Philippines, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, the
United Kingdom, and the United States.4
Following Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) ﬁve-yearly, non-overlapping, data
averages are used unless otherwise noted, such that are six observations per coun-
t r y .T h ev a r i a b l e sa r ed e ﬁned as in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and denoted,
with the i and t subscripts omitted, as
• g: real per capita growth in GDP.
• ˙ p: ln(1 + ˙ p),w h e r e˙ p is the domestic rate of inﬂation;
• I: I/GDP, the ratio of gross domestic investment to GDP;
• y0:l n (y0),w h e r ey0 is real per capita GDP, initial period;
• gov:l n (gov),w h e r egov is the share of government expenditure in GDP;
• trade: ln(trade), where trade is the share of total international trade in
GDP;
• bmp: ln(1 + bmp),w h e r ebmp is a black market premium;
• private: ln(private),w h e r eprivate is the ratio of the value of credits by
ﬁnancial intermediaries to the private sector to GDP - Levine, Loayza, and
Beck’s (2000) PRIVATE CREDIT;
• lly: ln(lly),w h e r elly is the ratio of liquid liabilities of the ﬁnancial system
to GDP - Levine, Loayza, and Beck’s (2000) LIQUID LIABILITIES;
• pprivate: ln(pprivate),w h e r epprivate is the product of ˙ p and private
(interaction term);
4Note that for the inﬂation rate data, 4 data points of the 186 are above 50%, three for Peru
and one for Mexico, and there are no negative rates of inﬂation.
9• plly: ln(plly),where plly is the product of ˙ p and lly (alternative interaction
term).
Note that only “liquid liabilities” and “private credit” enter as the ﬁnancial
intermediary controls, representing two of the three variables in Levine, Loayza,
and Beck (2000). The third one, the COMMERCIAL− CENTRAL BANK
proxy, is found to be insigniﬁcant in the speciﬁcations. Also, the only elements of
the conditioning sets retained are those indicated as signiﬁcant by Wald tests.
4. Results
The results presented in Table 4.1 represent a selection of the speciﬁcations, follow-
ing experiments with diﬀerent conﬁgurations of all of the potential conditioning
sets combined with all the various proxies of ﬁnancial development. Note that
education level proxies were not found to be robustly signiﬁcant.
4.1. Model Speciﬁcation: Explanatory Variables
In terms of the conditioning set variables, those considered in our Simple Con-
ditioning Set (inﬂation, the investment rate and initial GDP) are all strongly
signiﬁcant in each of the diﬀerent model speciﬁcations, suggesting that studies
which exclude one or more of these variables could potentially yield misspeciﬁed
inference. Moreover, the magnitudes of these coeﬃcients appear to remain sta-
ble across speciﬁcations. Additional variables included in Levine, Loayza, and
Beck’s (2000) Policy Conditioning Set were generally insigniﬁcant apart from the
speciﬁcations presented in Table 4.1.
T h em o s ts t r i k i n gr e s u l ti st h a tt h el e v e lo fﬁnancial development is consistently
statistically insigniﬁcant. This suggests that φ =0in equation (2.3). Other
results include a consistent, positive, signiﬁcant eﬀect of the investment rate, a
consistent, negative, signiﬁcant eﬀect of the inﬂation rate, and for the pprivate
and plly variables a negative, signiﬁcant, eﬀect of the interaction term.
10Table 4.1: Growth Regression Results
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4
Constant 0.425 0.458 0.388 0.446
(0.05)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗
˙ p -0.250 -0.187 -0.189 -0.206
(0.05)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗
I 0.003 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗
y0 -0.052 -0.056 -0.053 -0.054
(0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗
gov -- - 0 . 0 2 0 -
(0.01)∗∗
trade -- - 0 . 0 1 6 -
(0.01)∗∗
bmp --- - 0 . 0 2 8
(0.02)∗
pprivate - -0.043 -0.043 -0.058
(0.02)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗




0.735 0.722 0.737 0.727
LR ∼ χ2
33 169.697 163.91 169.244 167.578
Hausman ∼ χ2
df 47.34 (4) 50.19 (4) 56.83 (7) 49.03 (5)
Endogeneity ∼ N (0,1) 0.224 1.723 1.056 2.173
NT 186 186 186 186
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 5% size; ∗Signiﬁcant at 10% size.
LR refers to Likelihood Ratio tests of αi = λt =0 ,∀i,t.
Hausman tests are of ﬁxed versus random speciﬁcations.
Endogeneity tests the null-hypothesis that the inﬂation variable is exogenous.
114.2. Some Model Predictions
Using the equation given by Model (1) in Table 4.1, the predicted relationship
between inﬂation, ﬁnancial development, and growth can be visualized. For
˙ p ∈ (−0.02,0.5) and F ∈ (0.12,1.9), approximately the limit values in the sample,
a n dw i t hg r o w t ho nt h ev e r t i c a la x i s ,i n ﬂa t i o no nt h eX−axis, and ﬁnancial inter-
mediary development on the Z−axis a three-dimensional graph, Figure 4.1 shows
that for a given level of ﬁnancial intermediary development, growth decreases as
the inﬂation rate increases. This eﬀect is stronger the higher is the level of ﬁnan-
cial development. Also note that the negative inﬂation-growth eﬀect for a given
level of ﬁnancial development is slightly non-linear, getting somewhat stronger
as the inﬂation rate increases. In the other dimension, for a given positive level
of inﬂation, growth decreases nonlinearly as the level of ﬁnancial intermediary
development increases. This eﬀect is much more pronounced at higher levels of
inﬂation. And while there are no negative inﬂation rate data points in the sample,
it is noted that the simulation shows that at negative levels of the inﬂation rate
the growth rate increases negligibly as ﬁnancial development increases.
Figure 4.2 represents a cross-section of the 3-demensional graph (Figure 4.1),
corresponding to a ﬁxed value of F (0.25). It illustrates the negative, marginally
non-linear, relationship between inﬂation and growth (plotting inﬂa t i o no nt h e
X−a x i sa n dg r o w t ho nt h eY ), and shows that the growth rate turns negative at
an inﬂation rate close to 50%.
4.3. Model Speciﬁcation: Statistical Tests and Extensions
4.3.1. A Consistent Random Eﬀects Approach
This section extends the random eﬀects framework by explicitly taking the po-
tential observed-unobserved correlation into account in order to obtain consistent
parameter estimates. Consider the generic model of
git = w
0
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Figure 4.1: Inﬂation, Financial Development, and Growth









Figure 4.2: The Negative Inﬂation-Growth Eﬀect
where wit contains both time varying variables, xit, and time invariant ones, fi.




0,w h e r ew1it is a subset of wit that is independent of the unobserved





where zit is based upon w1it.N o t et h a tt h eλt are still treated as constants.
Using diﬀerent approaches concerning the partitions for wit, Table 4.2 re-
ports two diﬀerent versions of the GMM estimator. First, the Hausman and
Taylor (1981) (HT) estimator postulates zi =( f0
1i,x0
i)
0. Second, the Amemiya and






5Another approach is that, given constant correlation between w2it and αi over time, there
exists an orthogonality condition concerning the deviations from the means of the time eﬀects
that also yields a valid instrument (Breusch, Mizon, and Schmidt 1989). Because this approach
is found here to yield an estimator that is not well-deﬁned, its results are not reported.
14results of the HT and AM estimators as based on two alternative sets of candi-
dates for w1it. One set includes only the investment rate, Iit, while the other set
also includes the initial income, yi0.
Table 4.2: Growth Results: A Consistent Random Eﬀects Approach
w1it = Iit w1it =( Iit,y i0)
Base Model HT AM HT AM
Constant 0.425 0.101 0.022 0.016 0.028
(0.05)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗ (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)∗∗
˙ p -0.250 -0.189 -0.233 -0.251 -0.130
(0.05)∗∗ (0.08)∗∗ (0.05)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗
I 0.003 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002
(0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗
y0 -0.052 -0.011 -0.001 0.000 -0.002
(0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗ (0.00) (0.00) (0.00)
plly -0.088 -0.062 -0.082 -0.090 -0.034
(0.02)∗∗ (0.04) (0.03)∗∗ (0.03)∗∗ (0.02)∗
lly - -0.034 -0.021 -0.027 -0.012
- (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗
NT 186 186 186 186 186
R
2 0.73 -a 0.38 0.33 0.466
Sargan - 24.81 (1) 20.26 (7) 19.97 (2) 26.24 (14)
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 5% size; ∗Signiﬁcant at 10% size.
aNot well-deﬁned.
Sargan refers to Sargan (see Sargan 1958, Sargan 1988) χ2 tests for over-identifying restrictions,
degrees of freedom in parentheses.
The major diﬀerence here from Model 1 is that the level of ﬁnancial interme-
diation is signiﬁcant. However, controlling for the investment rate, the level of
ﬁnancial development appears to exert a negative eﬀect on growth. The signiﬁ-
cance and the magnitude of the interaction term between inﬂation and ﬁnancial
intermediation remains unaﬀected, except the HT case with w1it = Iit in which
the product term is insigniﬁcant. The range of the coeﬃcient of the estimated
eﬀect of the interaction term is (-0.034, -0.09) in comparison to -0.088 in Model
151.
The investigation of the correlation between the observed and unobserved vari-
ables appear to indicate robustness in the base model’s results, with the discrep-
ancy in particular with respect to ﬁnancial development. The ﬁnancial develop-
ment eﬀect goes in the opposite direction to that typically found in the literature.
However, an important qualiﬁcation to these results is that all of these speciﬁca-
tions signiﬁcantly reject the null hypothesis of valid instruments using the Sargan
criteria. The Sargan test indicates that the estimated parameters may be incon-
sistent.
4.3.2. Dynamic Growth Equations
Following Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000), the ﬁnal robustness check is to con-
sider the dynamic growth equations. Here the basic model is extended by in-
cluding lagged growth, gi,t−1. For the dynamic panel model the usual estimation
techniques are inconsistent. To allow for growth to follow an autoregressive pro-
cess while removing the unobserved eﬀects, it is common the write equation (4.1)
in terms of ﬁrst diﬀerences with a lagged dependent variable:
∆yit = δ∆yi,t−1 + ∆x
0
itβ + ∆εit. (4.2)
This model now contains only time-varying explanatory variables. Following Arel-
lano and Bond (1991) it is possible to consistently estimate the model by GMM
estimation based upon the moment conditions,
E (∆εitgi,t−j)=0 ,j=2 ,...,t− 1; t =3 ,...,T. (4.3)
T h em o m e n tc o n d i t i o n si m p l i e st h a tt h e∆εit do not follow a second-order serial
correlation process, a condition that is tested here.
Table 4.3 presents the results along with those of the Model 1 for comparison.
Note that estimation of a dynamic model is facilitated by use of a balanced panel.
Therefore two further countries are dropped from the sample, Korea and the
Philippines, and one year is dropped due to the dynamic nature of the model.
16Table 4.3: Dynamic Growth Results
Base Model Model D1 Model D2 Model D3 Model D4
Constant 0.425 0.008 0.008 - -
(0.05)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ --
gi,t−1 - -0.312 -0.311 -0.481 -0.482
- (0.06)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗ (0.06)∗∗
˙ p -0.250 -0.177 -0.177 -0.222 -0.222
(0.05)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗ (0.04)∗∗ (0.03)∗∗ (0.03)∗∗
I 0.003 0.003 0.003 0.002 0.002
(0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗
y0 -0.052 -0.081 -0.081 -0.039 -0.039
(0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.01)∗∗ (0.00)∗∗
plly -0.088 -0.052 -0.052 -0.072 -0.072
(0.02)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗ (0.02)∗∗
lly - 0.001 - -0.001 -
- (0.01) - (0.01) -
NT 186 125 125 125 125
R
2 0.73 0.67 0.67 0.66 0.66
Sargan - 22.01 (14) 21.77 (14) 22.51 (14) 22.44 (14)
m2 -1.61 -1.57 -2.23 -2.23
∗∗Signiﬁcant at 5% size; ∗Signiﬁcant at 10% size.
Sargan refers to Sargan χ2 tests for over-identifying restrictions, degrees of freedom in paren-
theses.


































Figure 4.3: Implied Convergence to an Exogenous Shock
When modelling the change i nt h er a t eo fg r o w t h ,ac o n s t a n tt e r mi nt h i s
equation implies that there is a constant rate of change in the growth rate, or a
trend in the rate of growth. Table 4.3 presents four speciﬁcations, Models D1-D4.
A trend in the rate of growth is included in D1 and D2, but not in D3 and D4.
The inﬂation rate parameter, φ in equation (2.2), is allowed to be non-zero by
including the level of ﬁnancial development, as is found in D1 and D3, with and
without a trend. Since the results indicates that the level of ﬁnancial development
is insigniﬁcant, the re-estimation excludes this variable in D2 and D4, with and
without a trend.
The growth process emerges as autoregressive with the lagged dependent vari-
able being strongly signiﬁcant. This variable’s negative sign indicates, as illus-
trated in Figure 4.3, that the return to the equilibrium growth path following
a shock is cyclical. With ˆ δ = −0.312 in Figure 4.3, an exogenous shock of ﬁve
percentage points leads to a relatively quick convergence with most adjustment
complete within four time periods.
18Although lagged growth is strongly signiﬁcant, the remaining coeﬃcients re-
main substantively unchanged across the base model and dynamic speciﬁcations.
This suggests that any potential omitted variable bias in Model 1 arising from
exclusion of gi,t−1 is minimal. In both base and dynamic speciﬁcations the level
of ﬁnancial intermediation insigniﬁcant and all the other variables are strongly
signiﬁcant. For example, in Model 1 the coeﬃcients on ˙ p and plly are (-0.250,
-0.088) compared to (-0.222, -0.072) and (—0.177,-0.052), in Models D2 and D4 of
the dynamic speciﬁcation.
The dynamic speciﬁcations all pass the Sargan test for over-identifying restric-
tions. However for Models D3 and D4 with the constant excluded, there is some
evidence of second-order serial correlation. These tests suggest that Model D2
performs well as a robustness check on Model 1. The coeﬃcient of the investment
rate term is the same in Models 1 and D2; the coeﬃcients for the inﬂation rate
a n dt h ei n t e r a c t i o nt e r ma r es o m e w h a tl o w e ri nD 2 ;a n dt h ei n i t i a li n c o m et e r m
has a somewhat higher coeﬃcient in D2.
5. Discussion
Speciﬁcations diﬀer from those in Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) and Rousseau
and Wachtel (2001) by including the investment rate, as suggested by the en-
dogenous growth theory for example in Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004). In
all speciﬁcations, this variable signiﬁcantly, robustly, and positively aﬀects the
growth rate. A positive correlation between the investment rate and ﬁnancial
development (in the sample the correlation is b ρ =0 .27) combined with a “large”
investment rate eﬀect, could result in a positive ﬁnancial development eﬀect if the
investment rate is erroneously omitted from the model.
The panel results of Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000) ﬁnd a positive, signif-
icant, association between ﬁnancial development and growth that comfortably
passes the robustness checks including a dynamic speciﬁcation. If an important
variable is erroneously omitted, such testing procedures would be within a biased
19framework. As the results of the paper here show similar robustness without such
a positive eﬀect from ﬁnancial development, the investment rate in particular
e m e r g e sa sac a n d i d a t ef o rs u c ha no m i t t e dv a r i a b l ei np r e v i o u sw o r k .
It is possible that the paper’s non-standard results on ﬁnancial development
are due to using a reduced sample size, as necessitated by excluding countries
for which the investment rate data is unavailable. This explanation may appear
to have credence from certain experiments. For example using Model 1 without
the inﬂation/ﬁnancial-development product term and the investment term, while
including the Liquid Liabilities variable, results in ﬁnding that ﬁnancial develop-
ment still is statistically insigniﬁcant. However, the standard results of a positive
ﬁnancial development eﬀect can nonetheless be replicated with the paper’s data
set. With the same experiment, but using the Levine, Loayza, and Beck (2000)
Private Credit variable instead of their Liquid Liabilities variable, and including
their Black Market Premium variable, the results ﬁnd that the ﬁnancial devel-
opment variable is signiﬁcant at the 1% level (two-sided); the negative inﬂation
eﬀect is also replicated at a 5% level of signiﬁcance (one-sided).
Another replication of standard results occurs when only the investment rate
only is excluded from Model 1, while Liquid Liabilities is included. The interaction
eﬀect is still negative and the eﬀect of the level of ﬁnancial development is positive.
However both of these variables have weak levels of signiﬁcance with t−statistics
respectively of -1.182 and 1.296.
Also note that a negative inﬂation-ﬁnancial-development interaction term is
consistent with the results in Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004). There a milder
inﬂation-growth eﬀect is found for an APEC sub-sample, and a stronger one is
found for an OECD sub-sample. This is consistent with taking two cross-section
slices of the Figure 4.1, one at a lower level of ﬁnancial development for APEC,
and one at a higher level of ﬁnancial development for the OECD. But in contrast
to Gillman, Harris, and Matyas (2004), now the results enable a full proﬁle across
the continuum of levels of ﬁnancial development.
206. Conclusions and Extensions
Combining the older Solow-type approach with endogenous growth variables con-
cerning human capital gives a basis for reexamining the robustness of the eﬀects
of inﬂation and ﬁnancial development. Using similar data, Levine, Loayza, and
Beck (2000) ﬁnd strong evidence of relationship between the level of ﬁnancial in-
termediation development and long-run growth in a cross-section setting. When
ﬁve-yearly averages are used, and a dynamic panel model estimated, these results
still hold. Rousseau and Wachtel (2001) focus on the interaction of inﬂation and
ﬁnancial development and again conﬁrm the results of Levine, Loayza, and Beck
(2000).
The new results presented in this paper show that when including the invest-
ment rate as in the Solow-growth literature, the level of ﬁnancial development
no longer can be said to positively aﬀect growth. Instead the level of ﬁnancial
development enhances the negative inﬂation-growth relationship. Financial de-
velopment is not robustly signiﬁcant by itself in this model, although a negative
stand-alone eﬀe c to ng r o w t hw a sf o u n di ns o m es p e c i ﬁcations. This suggests that
in previous results a positive eﬀect of ﬁnancial development may have been found
spuriously because ﬁnancial development is proxying the rate of return to physical
capital. Including a proxy for this rate of return through the investment rate, the
level of ﬁnancial development is found no longer to play that role.
This paper focuses on the eﬀect of inﬂa t i o no ng r o w t ha n do fﬁnancial develop-
ment on growth. Its results allow for a new interpretation of the role of ﬁnancial
development on growth by using the third related strand of literature: that of the
relation between inﬂation and ﬁnancial development. Khan and Smith (2001) and
Boyd and Smith (2001) ﬁnd that, at least for levels of inﬂation above a threshold
amount, an increase in the inﬂation rate causes a decrease in ﬁnancial depth, or
ﬁnancial lending to the private sector. This builds upon the ﬁndings of Aiyagari,
Braun, and Eckstein (1998), who present evidence of a scale eﬀect of inﬂation
on the size of the banking sector in high inﬂation countries. They ﬁnd conﬁr-
21mation of their theory that an increase in the inﬂation rate induces an increased
supply of exchange credit that is used to avoid the inﬂation tax and that causes
an expansion of the bank sector. Together these ﬁndings suggest the possibility
of an inﬂation-induced substitution within the bank sector from intertemporal,
or investment, types of credit towards inﬂation-tax avoiding types of exchange
credit.
The evidence of possible credit substitution combined with our results suggests
the following interpretation: countries with more developed ﬁnancial sectors may
be able to substitute more readily from investment credit to exchange credit in
seeking to avoid the inﬂation tax. This would cause a bigger decrease in investment
credit than would occur in the countries with the less developed bank sector
because investment credit may be substituted to a greater degree with exchange
credit in the more developed bank sectors. The bigger decrease in the investment
credit in turn could cause the bigger negative eﬀect of inﬂation on growth. While
this conjecture may be plausible, its supposition is oﬀered here only as a possible
direction for future research.
As far as the paper goes, it puts forth an endogenous growth type of model that
builds upon older Solow-growth type approaches. Bringing the investment rate
into the model in order to proxy the return on physical capital, as well as including
factors that aﬀect the return to human capital, the level of ﬁnancial development
plays a diﬀerent role. The hypothesis that the paper presents is that the level of
ﬁnancial development enables a stronger negative inﬂation-growth eﬀect, perhaps
because exchange credit is substituted in for growth-enhancing investment credit
more strongly, the more developed is the ﬁnancial sector.
T h er e s u l t sd on o tr u l eo u tt h a tﬁnancial development may be found to aﬀect
growth positively once data reﬁnements progress. It may be possible for example
that the inclusion of a more exact measure of the real return to physical capital
would enable a separate inﬂuence of ﬁnancial development to re-emerge. This
might yield once again support for Schumpeter’s interesting hypothesis, (see King
and Levine (1993)), of the beneﬁts of ﬁnancial development.
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